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In recent years, analysts have increasingly invoked neoclassical price
theory' to justify radical changes in the regulation of the American tele-
communications market, namely the trend toward competition and away
from traditional regulatory and rate-setting practices. Many economists
assert that competition and marginal-cost pricing2 will eliminate cross-
subsidization' and promote efficient markets for local and long-distance
telephone services and telecommunications equipment." Price theory, how-
ever, does not necessarily support structural reform of the telecommunica-
tions industry. Indeed, pre-divestiture pricing policy can be defended on
the same grounds its critics employ to advocate structural changes. This
article assesses the applicability of static price theory to market conditions
currently confronting local operating companies. It challenges the widely
held belief that structural reform in telecommunications is necessary to
achieve economic efficiency, particularly in intraLATA markets. It recom-
mends that regulators view with skepticism arguments derived from price
theory that purport to justify significant departures from historic pricing
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1. Neoclassical price theory applies microeconomic principles to describe market equilibria and
conditions of allocative efficiency. See C. FERGUSON, THE NEOCLASSICAL THEORY OF PRODUCTION
AND DISTRIBUTION 2-3 (1969).
2. Under marginal cost pricing, the price of each unit produced is set equal to the cost of resources
used to produce the last unit demanded. For an introduction to the efficiency of marginal cost pricing,
see P. SAMUELSON & W. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 691-92 (12th ed. 1985). The classic argument for
marginal cost pricing in regulated enterprises is found in Hotelling, The General Welfare in Relation
to Problems of Taxation and of Railway and Utility Rates, 6 ECONOMETRICA 242 (1938), reprinted
in AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 139 (R. Mus-
grave & C. Shoup eds. 1959). See also 1 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES
AND INSTITUTIONS 63-86 (1970).
3. Cross-subsidization often leads to opportunities for inefficient "cream skimming." See infra
note 97 and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., Kahn, The Road to More Intelligent Telephone Pricing, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 139
(1984).
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practices and that advocate wholesale competitive entry into intraLATA
markets.'
Part I of this article reviews the historical trend toward competition in
telecommunications. Part II demonstrates that price theory can be used to
defend pre-divestiture pricing policies. In particular, we argue that flat
rates, "cross subsidies," and monopoly suppliers do not necessarily cause
inefficiency. In Part III, we maintain that price theory analysis supports
the continued regulation of intraLATA telephone service.
I. The Trend Toward Competition in Regulated
Telecommunications Markets
To date, the trend in regulatory decision-making toward competition
and free entry into once regulated telecommunications markets has largely
been confined to interstate markets.' For more than a quarter century,
technological progress has been the driving force for change in the inter-
state telecommunications industry, setting into motion a chain of events
beginning in 1959 and continuing full-speed today. This technological
evolution began with greater opportunities to exploit new communications
technologies and innovations in equipment and service offerings. These
advances lured regulators into promoting competitive entry in selected seg-
ments of interstate telecommunications markets to capture the benefits of
innovation. Since competition threatened the financial viability of the reg-
ulated network, American Telephone & Telegraph Co. (AT&T)
responded by attempting to protect its markets through price changes.
Eventually, allegations of predatory pricing and cross-subsidization re-
sulted in the break-up of the Bell System and the policy of deregulation
that prevails in the interstate telecommunications industry.
The competitive era in the provision of long-distance telecommunica-
tions services began in 1959 with the decision of the Federal Communica-
5. A local access and transport area (LATA) is a geographical unit created after the AT&T
divestiture to reflect calling patterns. The local telephone company has a monopoly for both toll and
local service within each LATA and is precluded from providing any interLATA telecommunications
services. Since most LATAs fall entirely within one state, state utility commissions regulate in-
traLATA service. Thus, the recent pressure for regulatory reform in this area has been at the state
level. Where LATAs cover more than one state, regulation falls within the FCC's jurisdiction. See
generally United States v. Western Electric Co., Inc., 569 F. Supp. 990 (D.D.C. 1983).
Recently, state regulatory bodies have come under increasing pressure from Other Common Carri-
ers (OCCs) and resellers to open up intraLATA markets to competition. See, e.g., In Response to
Reseller's Petition, Arkansas Agrees to Rehearing on Competition Ban, TELECOMM. REP., Mar. 11,
1985, at 9; MCI, GTE Sprint, and LDTS Appeal W. Virginia Competition Order to State Supreme
Court, TELECOMM. REP., Mar. 18, 1985, at 18; Kansas Decides Against IntraLATA Competition;
Still Keeps Regulatory Hold on IXCs, TELECOMM. REP., June 17, 1985, at 11. Even the FCC
appears to be involved in encouraging intraLATA competition. See Stuart, Ruling on Phone Access
Aids Case for Business, N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1985, at D1, col. 4.
6. But see supra note 5.
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tion Commission (FCC or Commission) in Above 890' to allocate a por-
tion of the radio spectrum to high-volume users for private microwave
communication systems. Competitive entry in terminal equipment fol-
lowed in 1968, with the FCC's ruling in Carter v. AT&T (Carterfone).'
In Carterfone, Carter Electric Company, a supplier of a device for inter-
connecting mobile telephone users with other telephone users, challenged
tariff restrictions which prohibited the interconnection of telephone devices
not owned or supplied by AT&T. The FCC ruled that the tariff restric-
tions failed to distinguish between devices that would compromise the
technical integrity of the system and those that would not. Tariff restric-
tions against the latter devices were struck down,'0 thereby allowing inter-
connection of any device that met minimum technical standards.
In the 1970's, the trend toward competition continued with the FCC's
approval of the Microwave Communications Inc. (MCI) petition to offer
specialized long-distance services." AT&T again attempted to employ its
technical integrity argument, as in Carterfone, to prevent the entry of
MCI into the market for specialized long-distance services. Nevertheless,
the FCC allowed entry,' believing that specialized carriers would offer
innovative and specialized services rather than compete directly with
AT&T in the provision of message toll service (MTS)'3 or wide-area toll
service (WATS).' 4 It was only a matter of time, however, until MCI
7. In re Allocation of Microwave Frequencies in the Bands Above 890 Mc., 27 F.C.C. 359
(1959).
8. In re Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service; In re Thomas F.
Carter and Carter Electronics Corp., Dallas, Tex. v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., Associ-
ated Bell System Companies, Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., and General Telephone Co. of the
Southwest, 13 F.C.C.2d 420 (1968). The matter was also litigated in federal court. Carter v. AT&T
Co., 250 F. Supp. 188 (N.D. Tex.), af'd, 365 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1966).
9. The District Court declined to hear the case pending the conclusion of administrative proceed-
ings, holding that the FCC had primary jurisdiction to resolve all questions relating to the validity of
telephone company tariffs. 250 F. Supp. at 192.
10. Supra note 8.
11. MCI proposed to supply specialized voice and data services to private-line users that could not
be easily accomodated by the existing network. Suppliers of such services were called specialized com-
mon carriers (SCCs). In re Establishment of Policies and Procedures for Consideration of Application
to Provide Specialized Common Carrier Services in the Domestic Public Point-to-Point Microwave
Radio Service and Proposed Amendments to Parts 21, 43, and 61 of the Commission's Rules, 29
F.C.C.2d 870 (1971) (First Report and Order), aff'd sub nom. Wash. Util. & Transp. Comm'n v.
FCC, 513 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1975).
12. In re Establishment of Policies and Procedures for Consideration of Application to Provide
Specialized Common Carrier Services in the Domestic Public Point-to-Point Microwave Radio Ser-
vice and Proposed Amendments to Parts 21, 43, 61 of the Commission's Rules (First Report and
Order), 29 F.C.C.2d at 941.,'
13. See AT&T Communications, Long Distance Message Telecommunications Service, F.C.C.
Tariff No. 1, Oct. 30, 1984 (basic description and charges for what is commonly called "long
distance").
14. See AT&T Communications, Wide Area Telecommunications Service, F.C.C. Tariff No. 2,
October 16, 1985. WATS service is designed primarily for business customers who make many long
distance calls. The calls are transmitted over the same lines as MTS calls, but the prices are lower
than for MTS service.
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introduced Execunet service, which competed directly with AT&T's MTS
and WATS services.' Overturning an FCC decision prohibiting
Execunet, the Court of Appeals in 1978 ordered the FCC to allow MCI
to offer long-distance service in competition with AT&T. 6
Subsequent decisions further enlarged the scope of competition in the
long-distance market. Shortly after the Execunet decision, the FCC
removed tariff restrictions prohibiting the resale and shared use of leased
lines. 17 This decision permitted competitors of AT&T to lease channels at
discounted rates, such as WATS, and resell them as value-added services,
thus competing directly with AT&T's more expensive service offerings,
such as MTS."8 Furthermore, the Commission freed these competitors
(the Other Common Carriers or OCCs) from rigid price, entry, and ser-
vice regulations, citing their relatively limited market power.' 9
AT&T responded to competitive threats by engaging in allegedly pred-
atory pricing. Soon after the Commission's decision in Above 890, AT&T
filed its TELPAK tariffs"' which offered discounts for large bundles of
private lines. The tariffs were designed to meet the needs of users who
might otherwise construct their own microwave transmission systems."
15. See In re MCI Telecommunications Corp. Investigation Into The Lawfulness of Tarriff FCC
No. I Insofar As It Purports To Offer Execunet Service, 60 F.C.C.2d 25 (1976).
16. MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1040
(1978) (Execunet I); In re Petition of American Telephone and Telegraph Co for a Declaratory
Ruling and Expedited Relief, 67 F.C.C.2d 1455 (1978); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. FCC, 580 F.2d
590 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 980 (1978) (Execunet II). See also In re MCI Telecommuni-
cations Corp. Revisions to Tariff No. 1, Transmittal Nos. 86 and 88, 68 F.C.C.2d 1553 (1978)
(FCC's compliance on remand).
17. In re Regulatory Policies Concerning Resale & Shared Use of Common Carrier Services &
Facilities, 60 F.C.C.2d 261 (1976), reh'g granted, In re Regulatory Policies Concerning Resale &
Shared Use of Common Carrier Services & Facilities, 62 F.C.C.2d 588 (1977), af'd sub nom.
AT&T Co. v. FCC, 572 F.2d 17 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 875 (1978).
18. This result is what the court intended. Id.
19. In re Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Services and
Facilities Authorizations Therefor (First Report and Order), 85 F.C.C.2d 1 (1980); (Second Report
and Order), 91 F.C.C.2d 59 (1982); reconsid. denied, 93 F.C.C.2d 54 (1983).
20. In re American Tel. & Tel. Co. Tariff No. 250, TELPAK Service and Channels (Memoran-
dum Opinion and Order), 37 F.C.C. 1111 (1964), (Tentative Decision) 38 F.C.C. 370 (1964), recon-
sid. denied, 38 F.C.C. 761 (1965), aff'd sub nom. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. FCC, 377 F.2d
121 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 943 (1967).
21. This is consistent with the economic theory of limit pricing, which predicts that a monopoly or
dominant firm will reduce prices to the extent necessary to deter entry. See F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL
MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 232-52 (2d ed. 1980); Bain, A Note on Pric-
ing in Monopoly and Oligopoly, 39 AM. ECON. REV. 448, 454-63 (1949); and Gaskins, Dynamic
Limit Pricing: Optimal Pricing Under Threat of Entry, 3 J. EcoN. THEORY 660 (1971).
AT&T apparently perceived the private provision of telecommunications services as a form of com-
petitive entry. It has been noted that the Gaskins limit pricing model is particularly relevant to the
telecommunications market because of the high capital investment necessary to provide telecommuni-
cations services. Noll, The Future of Telecommunications, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION
TODAY AND TOMORROW 41, 55 (E. Noam ed. 1983). For an argument that limit pricing should not
be construed as predatory pricing, see Note, Telex v. IBM: Monopoly Pricing Under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, 84 YALE L.J. 558 (1975).
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AT&T's filings drew harsh attacks from competitors, sparking the long
and still unsettled search for a costing methodology which would allow the
Commission to evaluate allegations of cross-subsidization.22
Allegations of cross-subsidization arose again when AT&T filed its Hi-
Lo tariffs in response to MCI's initial entry into the market for "special-
ized" common carrier services." Departing from its traditional practice of
rate averaging, AT&T proposed to offer a Hi-Lo tariff in which it par-
tially "deaveraged" rates in order to reduce them for private-line services
on high-density routes. 24 Thus, when threatened by competition, AT&T
reacted by petitioning the FCC to block entry; when that strategy failed,
the company filed tariffs to match its competitors' offerings.
These trends toward competition in interstate markets called into ques-
tion the traditional principles governing the pricing of telecommunication
services. One economist after another sought to educate the FCC and the
state regulatory commissions on the implications of static price theory5 in
testing for the presence of cross-subsidization. Eventually, debate on this
topic came to serve as a backdrop for rationalizing a more far-reaching
structural change than the mere introduction of selective competition: the
breakup of AT&T.2
22. See In re American Telephone and Telegraph Co. Manual and Procedures for the Allocation
of Costs, 84 F.C.C.2d 384, 384-85, 412-31 (1981).
23. In re AT&T Co. Charges, Regulations, Classifications & Practices for Voice Grade/Private
Line Serv. (High Density-Low Density), 55 F.C.C.2d 224 (1975); 58 F.C.C.2d 362 (tariff rejected as
discriminatory); 59 F.C.C.2d 428 (1976).
24. AT&T's pricing policy had traditionally been based on a national average of per-mile costs.
Thus, the rate for service between two small rural communities 1000 miles apart was identical to the
rate for service between two large urban centers 1000 miles apart, though the cost of service might
have been much lower for the high-traffic route. By selectively entering the market only for the lower-
cost, high-traffic routes, MCI could undercut the AT&T rates based on systemwide average costs. 2
A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 147 (1971). By
"deaveraging" its rates, AT&T sought to remain competitive with the OCCs in high-density markets.
AT&T Voice Grade/Private Line Serv. (High Density-Low Density), 55 F.C.C.2d 224, 227 (1975).
25. Cost curves and supply-and-demand diagrams, as ordinarily drawn, are dimensionless with
respect to time. In economics, this type of analysis is referred to as "comparative statics" or, as here,
"static price theory." See R. HEILBRONER & L. THUROW, THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM 110 (6th ed.
1981). "Regulators, legislators, and businessmen have been increasingly influenced by economic the-
ory as academics have come to play a larger role in government and business." Garfinkel & Linhart,
The Transition to Local Measured Telephone Service, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Aug. 16, 1979, at 17, 19.
26. For the district court decree ordering divestiture, see United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F.
Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982) (text of the decree), affd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S.
1001 (1983); United States v. Western Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp. 1057 (D.D.C. 1983) (approving the
plan of reorganization). In addition, there are a number of supplemental rulings in Western Electric
by the judgment court published at 578 F. Supp. 662 (foreign exchange offerings), 578 F. Supp. 643
(mobile radio services), 578 F. Supp. 653 (tariff filings), 578 F. Supp. 668 (routing), 578 F. Supp.
677 (third party intervention), and 578 F. Supp. 680 (federal contracting).
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II. Cost Structure and Pricing
The divestiture of AT&T has been heralded as an opportunity to elimi-
nate cross-subsidization and to price services at their marginal costs, 7 yet
static price theory fails to prove that traditional pricing of telecommunica-
tions services seriously distorts the allocation of resources. Moreover, static
price theory limits its concern to efficiency in the allocation of resources
and ignores the effects of scale economies and technical change on the
overall level of costs. This Part examines the cost structure of the
telecommunications industry to evaluate the arguments used in justifying
structural reforms.
Historically, the pricing of telecommunications services has been based
on a "value of service" concept, in which services are priced according to
their value to a defined group of customers, rather than on the strict "cost
of service" approach typical of other public utility services. 8 Although
elements of the value-of-service approach can be defended in retrospect by
static efficiency criteria,29 value-of-service pricing was probably pursued
as a pragmatic response to the insurmountable difficulties of pricing a
multiproduct enterprise with complex cost characteristics "at cost."" 0
Many economists contend that historical pricing practices involve per-
vasive cross-subsidies.3 1 Three aspects of telecommunications pricing have
been increasingly attacked as economically unsound: (1) flat rate pricing
for local service, (2) class-wide rate averaging, and (3) contributions from
toll revenues toward the recovery of access costs.3 2 The economists' attacks
imply-with little supporting empirical evidence 8 -that traditional pric-
ing practices have distorted resource allocation. Alfred Kahn contends:
The simple economic principle is that you don't charge people for
benefits their enjoyment of which imposes no cost on society. The
proper price of each good or service is what it costs society to supply
it-not how much people benefit from it."'
27. See Kahn, supra note 4, at 149.
28. J. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 378-79 (1961).
29. See I A. KAHN, supra note 2, at 155; J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 28, at 89.
30. Pricing "at cost" usually refers to pricing a service at its marginal cost of production. Value-
of-service pricing is closely related in effect, if not in intent, to so-called Ramsey pricing, discussed
infra at note 82 and accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., Kahn, supra note 4, at 143-44.
32. See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
33. See Crandall & Owen, The Marketplace: Economic Implications of Divestiture, in DISCON-
NECTING BELL: THE IMPACT OF THE AT&T DIVESTITURE 47, 56"(H. Shooshan ed. 1984).
34. Kahn, A Needed Dose of Competition, 27 CHALLENGE 24, 25 (1984). In a parenthetical state-
ment that immediately follows, Kahn adds:
Actually the prescription is more complicated: prices should be equated to marginal costs,
which consumers will then equate to marginal benefits; and when prices equated to marginal
costs don't bring enough revenues to cover total costs, it may be necessary to discriminate
Vol. 3: 53, 1985
Price Theory
Current pricing reforms rest on the proposition that economic efficiency
requires that all services be priced at cost, a premise which departs signifi-
cantly from the value-of-service concept. Static price theory as used by
these economists, however, does not prove that value-of-service pricing
creates distortion. The theory omits consideration of too many factors of
critical importance in the telecommunications market and ignores the
efficiency effects of scale economies and technological change. 5 Joint costs,
common costs, economies of scale, and complementarity of production are
all present in the production of telecommunications services; all reduce the
relevance of static price theory.
The cost conditions underlying supply of telecommunications services
are too complex to be reduced to any "simple economic principle" as
Kahn has suggested." Considerations of utility favor flat-rate pricing for
local service. In addition, recognition that demand for access is derived
demand 7 implies that much of the telecommunications product cannot be
unbundled and thereby priced separately.
A critical evaluation of the telecommunications market leads us to con-
clude that the local operating companies within each LATA remain natu-
ral monopolies, and that these monopolies may not be sustainable without
continued regulation of price and entry. New entrants might serve one
segment of the local market at a lower cost than the monopolists, but such
entry would raise the overall average cost of telecommunications services
to all consumers. In other words, allowing "hit-and-run" entry on the
theory that contestability will preserve competitive price structures is
short-sighted.
A. In Defense of Flat Rates
Economists object to flat rate pricing primarily because of cross-
subsidization and inefficient levels of consumption. When evaluating
claims of cross-subsidization, it is important to distinguish the traffic-
sensitive/non-traffic-sensitive dichotomy from the fixed costs/variable
costs convention. The important difference is that traffic sensitive costs can
be recovered by flat-rate pricing without necessarily incurring the misallo-
cations to which economists object.
among customers on the basis of their evaluations of benefits ....
Kahn fails to note that marginal cost prices failing to cover total costs is, according to some, the
pricing problem in telecommunications.
35. See M. FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY 133 (1976).
36. Kahn, supra note 34.
37. Infra note 72 and accompanying text.
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Costs incurred in establishing a telecommunications network are typi-
cally divided into non-traffic-sensitive (NTS) costs and traffic-sensitive
(TS) costs. Generally, local switching and transmission are traffic-
sensitive; the investment required to satisfy customer demands depends on
the overall volume and pattern of calls. Similarly, design costs of a long-
distance toll network are sensitive to the number of calls being made. On
the other hand, the facilities needed to connect a customer to a local end
office represent NTS costs. NTS equipment is dedicated to a specific cus-
tomer; the only calls it carries are to and from that customer."3
The pre-divestiture Bell System approached this dichotomy with value
of service pricing-flat-rate pricing for local service and per-minute
charges for toll usage. Economists criticized this pricing scheme because it
did not properly allocate costs between TS and NTS plant. Critics
claimed that value-of-service pricing caused some TS costs associated with
the local network to be recovered through the monthly flat rate, while
usage-sensitive toll rates allegedly contributed to recovery of NTS local
loop costs through the separations and settlements process. 9 This inter-
pretation of cost allocation and recovery is arbitrary; it confuses usage-
sensitive and traffic-sensitive with the fixed and variable costs of econom-
ics. Since toll calls use facilities which are TS but constitute fixed costs,
such calls should contribute to the recovery of fixed costs. Indeed, usage
sensitive toll rates recovered (and continue to recover) a portion of the
fixed cost of the local network other than the local loop. Economists were
not concerned about this use of usage-sensitive toll rates to recover fixed
38. The essential elements of a telecommunications network are:
(1) inside wiring and customer premises equipment;
(2) a line drop and a cable pair connecting the customer's premises with a local end office;
(3) local switching and transport; and
(4) toll switching and transport.
The line drop and cable pair are dedicated facilities, or NTS, and represent most of the NTS costs
incurred by a local network. See Kahn, supra note 4, at 141. These NTS facilities constitute the link
between the customer and all other phones on the system by connecting the phone to the local end
office. For a discussion of this access cost, see infra note 62 and accompanying text.
39. Baldwin, Telco Managers Must Take the Initiative in Fighting the Bypass Threat, TELEPH-
ONY, Mar. 5, 1984, at 50 (arguing that historical rate structures have led to "economic aberrations"
in the pattern of cost recovery).
"Separations is the process by which the investment and expenses of telephone companies are allo-
cated to the interstate and intrastate jurisdictions. Such allocations provide the mechanism by which
revenue requirements for interstate and intrastate operations are developed." In re Prescription of
Procedures for Separating and Allocating Plant Investment, Operating Expenses, Taxes, and Reserves
Between the Intrastate and Interstate Operations of Telephone Companies. Petition of the National
Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners to Amend Part 67 of the Code of Federal Regula-
tions, 80 F.C.C.2d 230 (1980) (Memorandum Opinion and Order). The current separations and
settlements system employed by the FCC incorporates the so-called Ozark plan. As compared to for-
mer procedures, the Ozark plan increased substantially the amount of joint and common costs borne
by long distance services. In re Prescription of Procedures for Separating and Allocating Plant Invest-
ment, Operating Expenses, Taxes, and Reserves Between the Intrastate and Interstate Operations of
Telephone Companies, 26 F.C.C.2d 247, 247-64 (1970).
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costs. Why not argue that the monthly flat rate was intended to contribute
to that part of the local network, again, fixed in cost, but not a part of the
local loop, used to route toll calls?
Economists generally dislike flat-rate pricing because in theory it
encourages inefficient levels of consumption.4 Flat rates are supposed to
be inefficient because a reallocation of consumption would raise total con-
sumer utility more than it would raise total costs. Likewise rates based
upon class-wide cost averaging rather than individual marginal costs can
produce allocative inefficiencies. These arguments against rate averaging
and flat rates, an extreme example of rate averaging, can be illustrated
using basic static price theory. In Figure 1, let S be the commodity supply
curve, and D1 and D2 be the demand curves of two different individuals
(or classes of service). Efficient prices are determined by the intersections
of D1 and D2, respectively, with S. That is, consumer utility is maximized
when Q* is consumed at price P*, and Q* is consumed at price P*. Sup-
pose, however, that a non-usage sensitive flat rate of PA is charged over an
interval that spans at least from Q to G,. Alternatively, PA could be
derived by rate averaging, classifying costs along the interval Q* to Q*
into a single average cost for both consumers.
In either case, the result is the same. The consumer whose demand is
D1 is led by a price PA to consume only Q1, rather than Q*. At Q , the
utility to be derived from additional consumption exceeds the marginal
cost of the additional consumption. The total utility to be derived from
increasing consumption from Q to Q* is the triangle acd. But at a con-
sumption level of Q* the consumer faces the price of P*, so the net gain
(consumer surplus) is the smaller triangle abd. In the case of the second
consumer, a price of PA leads to overconsumption, that is, consumption at
Q2 rather than Q*. If this consumer's consumption were curtailed from Q2
to Q* by changing to price P*, the total increase in welfare would be
represented by the triangle egh. However, this would involve a loss in
consumer's surplus given by the triangle fgh. The net gain from reducing
the second consumer's consumption to Q* is thus only the triangle efh.
40. The following is a typical critique of flat-rate pricing:
Flat rate pricing provides lower total benefits to consumers and producers than a pricing
system responsive to the amount of usage consumed. How many pubs provide beer on a flat
rate basis? How many supermarkets offer flat rate groceries? How many electric companies
offer electricity for a fixed monthly charge?
Flat rate pricing is extremely inefficient when usage varies greatly among customers, when
costs vary with usage, when demand is responsive to price, and particularly when the
incremental costs of measurement are low.
Crew & Hammelman, Local Measured Service Assumes a New Role, TELEPHONY, Apr. 16, 1984, at
61.
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Consequently, setting prices at cost would increase total consumer welfare
by the sum of the triangles abd and ejh.
Although Figure 1 illustrates the potential for net efficiency gains, the
general public may not appreciate such gains. When an economist says
that a reallocation of resources will "improve economic efficiency," the
public most likely interprets this to mean lower overall costs because of
improvements in productive efficiency. Public approval is unlikely when a
regulator says: "On the whole, structural reform may raise your phone
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that economists measure efficiency by consumer utility, not costs. This
misunderstanding is never addressed in popular writing on telecommuni-
cations reform.4"
Figure 1 demonstrates the theoretical static inefficiency of rate averag-
ing but only because we assume that there is a single cost function for
serving both types of customers. Without this assumption, a great deal of
additional uncertainty surrounds conclusions about the effect of rate aver-
aging on resource allocation. Where the elements of both aggregate
demand functions and cost structures are non-homogeneous and uncertain,
it is impossible to know what the effect of rate averaging will be. Figure
2, for instance, depicts a case in which rate averaging leads to efficient
consumption levels. Suppose there are two customer classes, urban and
rural. Assume that the supply costs for rural customers are greater than
supply costs for urban customers, but that rural demands are less than
urban demands. There might be some average price PA such that efficient
consumption levels result in both markets. While there is some support for
the market characteristics hypothesized in Figure 2, the real value of this
analysis lies in showing that rate averaging cannot be rejected as ineffi-
cient per se.
As important as these insights may be, the economic rhetoric against
flat-rate pricing and rate averaging is susceptible to a more fundamental
critique: TS costs can be efficiently recovered through a flat-rate tariff.
The distinction between TS and NTS costs in telecommunications arises
not because some costs are fixed and others are not, but because some
facilities are dedicated to use by a specific customer. Traffic sensitivity is
not synonymous with usage sensitivity. The telecommunications industry
stands in sharp contrast to the pub owner.4 While the total cost of beer to
a pub owner increases every time a patron orders another, the cost of a
local telephone network does not increase each time a customer lifts a
telephone off the hook." Thus, the cost of the telephone network is not
usage-sensitive, at least until the peak usage exceeds the capacity of the
41. The thrust of the popular literature seems to be that elimination of cross-subsidies may drive
up local rates, but that this will somehow be offset by a decline in toll rates. But even if cross-
subsidies exist and it is possible to improve allocative efficiency by eliminating them, such an elimina-
tion does not guarantee a reduction in aggregate costs. An improvement in economic efficiency only
requires that consumer utility increase more than aggregate costs. Economists typically avoid
accepting responsibility for the distributional consequences of public policy recommendations. It seems
to suffice for them to say that those who gain from reallocation could compensate those who lose for
the effect of redistributing consumer surplus (the excess of consumer utility over the actual price
paid), and that the reallocation is therefore more efficient having, on balance, made everybody better
off. But in the real world of public policy, distributional consequences are difficult to ignore. If econo-
mists are going to advocate public policy changes, they should at least alert the public to the distribu-
tional consequences of their recommendations.
42. Crew & Hammelman, supra note 40.
43. See infra note 77.
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current network. 4" All plant costs required to render telecommunications
service are, strictly speaking, fixed costs, whether or not they are traffic-
sensitive. For example, were the TS and NTS distinctions applied in the
electric utility industry, all generating capacity would be labelled traffic-
sensitive, although its cost is fixed. Absent congestion or a peak-load prob-





sensitive generation cost is recovered through a non-usage-sensitive
demand charge in a two-part tariff.""
It is incorrect, therefore, to insist that static price theory requires recov-
ery of traffic-sensitive telecommunications costs through usage-sensitive
pricing. The level of investment required to serve a given volume of traffic
is a function of the volume of traffic, but this does not make the cost of
traffic-sensitive plant a variable cost as economists ordinarily use the term.
Once a given level of capacity is in place, the marginal cost of using that
44. See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
45. Under a two-part tariff, consumers must pay an entry fee calculated to recover overhead costs
incurred to provide the service. Each unit consumed is then priced at marginal cost. E. ZAJAC, FAIR-
NESS OR EFFICIENCY: AN INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC UTILITY PRICING 37 (1978); 1 A. KAHN,
supra note 2, at 95; and J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 28, at 310.
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plant is zero. No economic rationale exists for attempting to limit network
use through usage-sensitive pricing. Society gains nothing by inducing
consumers to forgo increased use of service if the marginal cost is zero. In
static welfare theory, the value of a good or service with zero marginal
cost is maximized when each consumer uses the good or service up to the
point where the marginal utility of the last unit of use is zero. With a flat
rate for unlimited local calling, the level of use selected by customers will
presumably reflect the point at which the marginal utility of additional
use becomes negative. Customers will use the network up to the point
where they would rather be doing something else than chatting on the
phone."' Although some customers may use the network more than others,
in no sense can it be alleged that high-volume users are being subsidized
by low-volume users; no cost is avoided if the high-volume users reduce
their use of the network.4
At some point, of course, the volume of traffic on any given network
begins to strain the plant capacity in place.'" This fact alone, however,
does not justify discriminating among customers on the basis of use. Addi-
tional investment made to expand the network is a fixed cost that benefits
all network users equally. Hence all users, inframarginal or not, cause the
costs incurred at the margin. Traffic-sensitive costs incurred to expand the
fixed capacity of a network are caused by all users of the network equally
and cannot be attributed to one specific class of users."' At the margin, all
users are responsible for any capacity expansion costs incurred, regardless
of whether or not they are the marginal user, since the cost would be
avoided if inframarginal users sufficiently reduced their consumption.
A classic example of proper, but counter-intuitive, allocation of incre-
mental capacity costs arises when a water main initially installed to serve
a housing subdivision becomes inadequate as additional houses are built.
Assume the existing water main must be replaced entirely by a larger
46. Pricing to recover the cost of a telecommunications network is no different conceptually than
pricing to recover any large sunk cost such as a bridge or a hydroelectric facility. In these cases, usage-
sensitive pricing merely allocates sunk capacity costs in proportion to willingness-to-pay. The person
who values the use of an asset most will, presumably, use it the most, and under a usage-sensitive
pricing scheme, will then pay the most. However, no additional capacity costs are imposed by those
who use the asset more heavily than others, and thus a usage-sensitive tariff or facilities charge cannot
be said to be "cost-based" as economists are applying the term in telecommunications. Cf MacAvoy
& Robinson, Losing by Judicial Policymaking: The First Year of the AT&T Divestiture, 2 YALE J.
ON REG., 225, 251-52 (1985); Kahn, supra note 4, at 140-41.
47. An exception exists when a network is designed with a certain capacity to meet the demands
placed on it during periods of peak use.
48. For a discussion of the determination of optimal capacity, see Williamson, Peak-Load Pric-
ing and Optimal Capacity Under Indivisibility Constraints, 56 AM. ECON. REV. 810 (1966).
49. Contra Kahn, supra note 4, at 147-48. Kahn argues that telephone access costs are analogous
to electric distribution costs. We, however, are concerned here with traffic-sensitive costs, which are
more appropriately analogous to electric generation or transmission costs.
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main. Who should pay for this work?50 While one might logically argue
that the new homeowners created the need for an extension of the main
(just as the original homeowners created the need for the original main),
economic theory does not provide a logical basis for assigning the respon-
sibility for the entire cost of upgrading the size of the existing main to the
new homeowners. The larger size is required to meet the needs of all
users, and costs should be assigned accordingly.
Debate over the proper pricing of telecommunications services evidences
similar confusion. Consider, for instance, the following argument:
Americans have incorporated the telephone more and more into their
way of life, and as the price of substitutes for telephone service (mail
and gasoline, for example) have increased rapidly, local use per tele-
phone account has increased. This, of course, has entailed an
increase in the cost of providing local service ...
The flat rate structure cannot distinguish whether any particular
customer has in fact elected to make more use of local service. 1
To the extent that this argument is based upon usage-sensitive capacity
costs, the fact that a customer elects to make more use of the network is
irrelevant; any customer could make less use of the network, and addi-
tional capacity necessary to supply the increased usage could be avoided.
At any given point in time, the marginal cost of using the network is the
same for all consumers whether they use or have used the network a little
or a lot. Charging rates based upon usage is in reality a form of price
discrimination. 2
The most plausible rationale for usage-sensitive pricing for the local
network is the peak-load problem. The existence of a peak period imposes
capacity costs5 that would not be incurred if the volume of use did not
vary by the time of day. It is consistent with conventional economic theory
to charge those peak-load capacity costs to those who created them. How-
ever, this reasoning does not require usage-sensitive rates around the
clock. Tariffs with measured service during peak hours and a basic flat
rate with unlimited local service at all other times would meet the
50. While the answer may not be in doubt to those existing homeowners who look with disfavor
on having to pay any of the cost of upgrading the main, strict economic theory takes a less definite
view of the matter. If enough of the original homeowners were to stop consuming, the original main
would be adequate to meet the needs of the new homeowners.
51. Garfinkle & Linhart, supra note 25, at 17-21.
52. It may, however, be a rational form of price discrimination. See infra note 82 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of Ramsey prices or so-called optimal departures from marginal cost. The
point here is that charging on the basis of use is not cost-based pricing.
53. When demand varies over time, a network's capacity must be sufficient to meet the maximum
demand. A portion of this capacity is idle during all non-peak hours. Thus, capital resources are
invested in capacity that is not fully utilized.
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standards for economically efficient pricing." Moreover, to the extent that
residential calling tends to peak in the early evening, while traffic on the
whole peaks during normal business hours, the historic differential
between business and residential flat-rates already embodies an element of
peak-load pricing. 5 Finally, capacity costs vary according to certain pat-
terns of usage-time of day, duration of call, and distance over which the
call is routed. Tariffs incorporating such cost elements serve merely to
allocate capacity costs in the same manner in which they are incurred. If
the incremental capacity costs are allocated to peak period users, flat-rate
pricing with unlimited off-peak use is perfectly consistent with static price
theory."
Flat-rate pricing for local service, therefore, is unlikely to cause serious
distortions in consumption. If congestion at the peak is indeed a problem,
then the cost of local service should be based on a flat rate that incorpo-
rates incremental capacity costs. Alternatively, elements of measured ser-
vice pricing can be used to allocate capacity costs among peak period users
with a low, fixed rate for off-peak usage. In any event, the problem of
peak-load pricing is hardly unique to telecommunications and provides no
rationale for introducing competition into the markets for local telephone
service. 
5
B. Joint Costs, Common Costs, and the Issue of Cross-Subsidization
Many economists disfavor flat-rate pricing because it causes high-
volume users to subsidize low-volume users, a system which they claim is
bound to unravel. 8 Those who make this argument fail to realize that the
demand for access to the telephone network is derived from the demand to
make local and long-distance calls. This section dispels the myth that
unbundling is a panacea for the problem of cross-subsidization.
54. See 1 A. KAHN, supra note 2, at 92-93.
55. The same situation prevails in the pricing of electricity. See Eckel, Customer-Class Price Dis-
crimination by Electric Utilities, 37 J. ECON. & Bus. (forthcoming) (Virg. Polytech. Inst. Dep't of
Econ. working paper no. E84-04-01) (on file with the Yale Journal on Regulation). Peak-load pric-
ing, however, has not historically been a rationale for business/residential flat rate differentials. The
historical rationale has been the value of service concept.
56. Usage-sensitive toll rates vary by time of day, as they should to respond to the peak-load
problem. But this does not justify per se the use of usage-sensitive toll rates. Measured service during
the hours of peak use could be combined with a flat rate off-peak, as discussed in the case of local
service. To understand why the industry has historically employed usage-sensitive pricing for toll
service, one must look beyond strict cost causation.
57. Peak-load pricing is a problem frequently encountered in public utility pricing. See 1 A.
KAHN, supra note 2, at 89-103; J. BONBRGHT, supra note 28, at 359-66. Peak-load pricing is a rate
design issue, and thus it does not have a bearing on industry structure.
58. See, e.g., Kahn, supra note 4, at 143.
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Rather than attacking flat-rate pricing per se, advocates of deregulation
and selective competitive entry begin by attacking subsidies which they
allege are inherent in the toll revenue settlements process.5" For instance,
Alfred Kahn recently maintained that "the inefficiency of our historic
method of subsidizing basic service has ...become intolerable. 6 Simi-
larly, Mark Fowler, Chairman of the FCC and an architect of many
structural reforms in telecommunications, has claimed that:
Heavy toll users pay far more than the cost of their loops, while
light toll users escape paying part of the cost of their loops. This
results in an unintended, poorly targeted cross-subsidy with benefits
going to many people who can easily afford to pay the cost of their
loops and a corresponding unfair burden shouldered by many resi-
dences and small businesses.61
The cross-subsidy debate focuses upon the tariffs employed to recover
the NTS costs of the local network. These access costs6 2 must be incurred
before an individual subscriber can access the network to place a local or
toll call. Jules Joskow explains:
Access costs usually are referred to as the non-traffic sensitive costs
of providing telephone service. Although these costs are insensitive to
usage they, nevertheless, have been recovered through usage charges,
primarily on toll service. This means that users of very little long
distance service pay substantially less than the cost they impose and
high volume users pay substantially, often many times, more than
the cost they impose.68
Joskow here refers to the effect of the separations and settlement process,
which historically allocated to local operating companies a portion of the
revenues earned from toll services. Under the rationale for the separations
process, local operating companies were entitled to at least a portion of the
59. Kahn, supra note 4, at 143-44.
60. Kahn, supra note 34, at 26.
61. Fowler, Access Charges Will Do More Good Than Harm, TELEPHONY, Nov. 21, 1983, at 92.
The reference to the "unfair burden shouldered by many residences and small businesses" may be
little more than political posturing by Commissioner Fowler, who is astute enough to recognize the
emotional issues in the debate over telecommunications policy. Residences and small businesses are as
likely to be the light users who, according to Commisioner Fowler, "escape paying part of the cost of
their loops."
62. To access the telephone network, each user needs a connection from her telephone to the local
switch. This access, referred to as the local loop, is capital intensive, comprising the most significant of
the phone system's NTS costs. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
63. Joskow, Surprise and Concern: Justified Reactions to Higher Telephone Rates?, TELEPH-
ONY, Mar. 5, 1984, at 66, 72.
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revenues from toll rates as compensation for the use of the local network
to begin and complete toll calls."
It is not necessary for our purposes to examine in any detail the elabo-
rate cost allocation scheme that gradually evolved to facilitate the separa-
tions process. We simply note that toll revenues were allocated to local
networks on a usage-sensitive basis.6 Since the cost of the local loop is
fixed, this usage-sensitive allocation recovered more of the loop's cost from
high-volume users than from low-volume users. This alleged cross-
subsidization of low-volume users by high-volume users remains one of
the most controversial issues in telecommunications policy. 66
It was once uncontroversial to insist that local and toll service should
each make some contribution to the recovery of common or joint costs; the
debate was over the amount each service should contribute. In a novel
conceptual twist, some economists now seek to sidestep this prob-
lem-which has a long history in economics-by unbundling telecommu-
nications into a set of component services.67 In particular, proponents of
unbundling would segregate the cost of service into three components: (1)
access or NTS costs; (2) TS local network costs; and (3) TS toll network
costs.6" They would recover the fixed cost of the local loop through a
monthly access charge.6 9
Conventional economic wisdom posits that fixed costs should be recov-
ered through flat rates and variable costs should be recovered through
usage-sensitive rates."0 This approach does not, however, support the use
of fixed charges for the pricing of access, primarily because consumers do
not demand access for its own sake. 1
64. The allocation of toll revenues from interstate service to pay the joint costs of interstate and
local service was legally sanctioned by the U.S. Supreme Court in Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 282
U.S. 133, 150-51 (1930). Since that time, interstate toll revenues have been allocated to pay the costs
of connecting customers to the switched network. H.R. REP. No. 479, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1983).
See supra note 39.
65. In re Prescription of Procedures for Separating and Allocating Plant Investment, Operating
Expenses, Taxes and Reserves Between the Intrastate and Interstate Operations of Telephone Com-
panies, 26 F.C.C.2d 247, 250-51 (1970).
66. Where costs can be unambiguously allocated, subsidization and price discrimination are easy
to spot. In telecommunications, however, significant joint or common costs incurred in the provision of
local and toll service make direct allocation more problematic.
67. See, e.g., Kahn, supra note 4, at 141, 156-57.
68. Id.
69. Id.; Fowler, supra note 61.
70. See E. ZAJAC, supra note 45, at 37.
71. Admittedly, there is an option good aspect to being connected to the network, but this utility
does not derive solely from the cable pair that connects the user with the local end office. A consumer
may derive value, for example, from knowing that any important calls can be forwarded from office to
home. This requires using elements of the entire network, however, and not just the local loop. Option
value is thus not attributable solely to the access line.
Yale Journal on Regulation
The demand for access is a derived demand; access itself possesses no
inherent utility to users.7  Hence, there is no intrinsic demand curve or
demand price for access. Consumers desire access because it is necessary
for local or toll calling. We can derive the demand for access from the
demand for the ultimate service, but the demand so derived would not
exist absent demand for local or long-distance communications.
Unbundling is based on the assumption that toll revenues subsidize
access if they contribute any amount to the recovery of access costs. This
assumption would be correct if access possessed intrinsic utility to the con-
sumer and the demand for it were not derived. Since demand for access is
derived, however, the maximization of static economic efficiency does not
depend upon pricing access at cost as an unbundled commodity. Instead,
efficient prices for derived goods can be determined by examining the con-
ditions for efficiency in the market for the primary product."
The classic means of finding the efficient price for a derived good is to
subtract from the demand curve of the primary product the supply prices
for corresponding amounts of the other factor inputs. 4 This procedure
cannot be applied to access because the demand for access is derived from
the demand for two products: local service and toll service. Each of these
has an independent utility to the consumer. Thus, it is not clear whether
the demand price for access should be derived by subtracting the supply
price of local service from the demand for local service or by subtracting
the supply price of toll service from the demand for toll service. Indeed,
both derived demands must be considered in the access price analysis.
Those who argue that the cost of access should be allocated between
local and toll service, somewhat along the lines of the historical separa-
tions process, frequently refer to the classic partial equilibrium analysis of
joint and common costs. 7 5 But that analysis is of only limited usefulness
when applied to the access cost issue. The classic analysis of joint or com-
mon costs assumes that joint products can be individually priced at their
own marginal costs, creating a producer's surplus which covers joint or
common costs." Typically, however, a producer's surplus derives from an
upward-sloping supply curve. The cost for any given network capacity,
local or toll, is fixed and does not vary with usage. There is, thus, no
producer's surplus to fund joint or common costs. These costs must be
factored explicitly into the prices to be charged for local and toll service.
72. See A. MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 381-93 (8th ed. 1946).
73. See M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 35, at 153-56.
74. See A. MARSHALL, supra note 72, at 383.
75. See the "blades and handles" analogy in M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 35, at 154.
76. See W. SHARKEY, THE THEORY OF NATURAL MONOPOLY 38-39 (1982).
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In order to arrive at an efficient pricing scheme, we sum vertically the
demand curves for toll and local service to create an aggregate demand
curve, as illustrated in Figure 3. The demand curve for local service, D1,
and the demand curve for toll service, Dr, are summed vertically to pro-
duce a joint demand curve, Dl+ t. This aggregate demand curve expresses
the consumer's total willingness to pay for toll and local service combined.
All costs are treated as fixed and do not vary with use;77 thus, the system
resembles a public good .7  Aggregate local, toll, and access costs are repre-
sented by the cost curve Ci+t+a, which is hyperbolic. The efficient level of
usage from the consumer's perspective is Q , defined by the intersection of
Dl+, and C++ a . Efficient prices for local and toll service, P, and P,
respectively, can then be derived from the individual demand curves, Di
and D,. Local and toll users each contribute to recovering access costs. The
contribution of local service is
PlQ* - Cl,
where C1 is the allocated direct cost of local service. The contribution of
toll service is
PtQ* - Ct
where Ct is the allocated direct cost of toll service.
This analysis has several interesting implications. First, it suggests that
the contribution of each class of service to the recovery of access costs is
independent of the level of costs that can be directly allocated to either
class. Second, and perhaps of more interest, an appropriate allocation of
access costs will lead to the same intensity of use in each class of service,
77. In other words, we ignore variable costs, both because access costs are fixed and do not vary in
the short run with usage, and because telecommunications is intensive with few variable costs. For
instance, Howe and Rasmussen report that in 1975 communications had the second lowest fixed asset
turnover ratio in the economy, exceeded only by electric, gas, and sanitation services. The fixed asset
turnover ratio is a measure of the capital intensity of a business, and is calculated by dividing operat-
ing revenues by capital investment. In 1975 the fixed asset turnover ratio for communications was
only 0.44, compared to 2.14 for all industries. The fixed asset turnover ratio for all manufacturing,
where variable costs play a more significant role than in telecommunications, was 2.31. See K. HOWE
& E. RASMUSSEN, PUBLIC UTILITY ECONOMICS AND FINANCE 28 (1982). See also 1 A. KAHN,
supra note 2, at 35. Current estimates of the fixed asset turnover ratio (revenues divided by net plant)
for the regional Bell holding companies are: Ameritech, 0.62; Bell Atlantic, 0.58; BellSouth, 0.51;
NYNEX, 0.66; Pacific Telesis, 0.55; Southwestern Bell, 0.55; and U.S. West, 0.54. VALUE LINE,
Oct. 25, 1985 at 752-84 (Part 3). At the local level, telecommunications continues to be dominated by
fixed costs.
78. Public goods are characterized by non-rival consumption and high exclusion costs. Goods
which can be consumed by one person without diminishing the supply available for others are
nonrival in consumption. Exclusion costs are the costs of limiting consumption to certain people. E.
BROWNING & J. BROWNING, MICROECONOMIc THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 536-37 (1983); R.
MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 56-57 (3d ed. 1980).
The telecommunications system is like a public good inasmuch as it is characterized by non-rival
consumption, but it is not a pure public good because exclusion can be achieved at minimal cost.
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Ramsey Efficient Prices For
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regardless of variations in the level of directly allocable costs. This result
derives from our assumption that usage has some of the the characteristics
of a public good.7 9 Since total costs do not vary with use, the efficient level
of usage of each service is independent of the directly allocable costs of
each service.80 Thus we have, in effect, a Lindahl equilibrium."1
79. See Samuelson, Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public Expenditure, 37 REV. ECON.
& STATS. 350 (1955).
80. By assumption, all costs-are fixed and marginal cost equals zero. Usage priced at marginal
cost will therefore be free.
81. Lindahl, Just Taxation-A Positive Solution, in CLASSICS IN THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FI-
NANCE 168-76 (R. Musgrave & A. Peacock eds. 1958). Another analyst notes:
In a Lindahl equilibrium the role of price and quantity for a public good is exactly the reverse
of the role for a private good. Instead of a common price among all consumers, there is a
common quantity of consumption. Rather than an allocation of goods among consumers, there
is an allocation of the total cost of the public good among all buyers such that the price facing
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The telephone network, however, is unlike a pure public good because
Q* is not fixed. Consumption varies and reveals consumer preferences
with respect to given levels of consumption. Figure 3 implies that to
obtain the equivalent of a Lindahl equilibrium, consumers must not use
one type of joint service any more than the other. Suppose that we observe
that Qt, minutes of toll use, is greater than Qj, minutes of local use. The
implication is that toll service is underpriced relative to local service and is
not making a sufficient contribution to the recovery of access costs. A sepa-
rations procedure which allocates costs in proportion to usage would be
self-correcting, and would induce changes in consumption consistent with
a Lindahl-type equilibrium. While the settlements process may not have
functioned perfectly in this regard, at least it appears to have provided
proper incentives for cost allocation.
An attempt to set prices at other than Pt and P will produce inefficient
resource allocation. Suppose that Pt were reduced to some level P', and P
were increased to some level Pl' by allocating all common costs to local
service. Under the assumption in Figure 3 that the elasticity of D, is less
than the elasticity of D, the revenues lost by moving up the demand curve
D would be more than offset by revenues gained from moving down the
demand curve D. The result is aggregate revenues in excess of actual
costs. Exploiting demand elasticity to recover more than actual costs is
price discrimination. Conversely, allocating all common costs to toll service
would result in a failure to recover total costs.
The resulting solution is no different than the classical one: the appro-
priate allocation of common costs is determined by demand conditions in
the two markets and is independent of the respective costs of production.
Moreover, prices determined by an allocation of costs as suggested in Fig-
ure 3 may be Ramsey-efficient. While short-run marginal-cost pricing
would set prices at zero, such prices would fail to recover the fixed costs of
the business. In a manner similar to the inverse elasticity rule of Ramsey,
the Lindahl equilibrium in Figure 3 moves in the direction of the attaina-
ble welfare maximum by recovering fixed costs in inverse proportion to
the elasticity of demand for the services.""
a buyer corresponds to his or her marginal valuation of the total quantity and the sum of
prices facing consumers is equal to the production cost.
W. SHARKEY, supra note 76, at 46. We argue that if the allocation of access costs between toll and
local service leads to an allocation of usage that favors toll service over local service or vice versa, then
the price facing users does not correspond to their marginal valuation of the total quantity of service
available.
82. Where pricing at marginal cost fails to recover fixed or common costs, Ramsey pricing will
maximize consumer welfare. Ramsey pricing will increase prices over marginal cost. The increase will
be smaller in markets where demand is elastic than in markets where demand is inelastic. Thus
Ramsey pricing is often dubbed the "inverse elasticity rule." Ramsey prices will reduce each firm's
output of goods or services by an equal percentage from the quantity demanded under marginal cost
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Economics teaches us that in a production process with joint or common
costs, there is no such thing as pricing individual goods or services at
cost." Yet all costs must be recovered. The allocation of access costs
between toll and local service on the basis of usage is a pragmatic way to
set prices that are as Ramsey-efficient as they can be in practice.8 4 On the
basis of static efficiency criteria, then, historical pricing practices in tele-
communications have not been as inefficient as some critics allege.
C. Contestability, Sustainability, and Public Policy Toward
Competitive Entry
In the previous two sections, we have examined two supposed evils of a
regulated telecommunications market: flat-rate pricing and cross-
subsidization. To eliminate these evils, proponents of deregulation advo-
cate competition as a mechanism for setting prices. In theory, competition
will drive prices toward marginal cost, thereby maximizing economic effi-
ciency. Suppliers will therefore no longer be able to set flat-rate prices or
subsidize the cost of one product with the revenues from another.85
In markets that are natural monopolies, however, competition cannot
ensure marginal cost pricing. In natural monopoly markets that are served
by a single supplier, only the credible threat of potential competition will
guarantee competitive prices. Such markets, where the threat of potential
entry is sufficient to maintain competitive equilibrium, are said to be con-
testable. Deregulation therefore will cure the inefficiencies of flat-rate
pricing and cross-subsidization only in those monopoly markets that are
contestable.
A market is said to be perfectly contestable if: (1) entry and exit entail
minimal sunk investment costs; (2) the technology employed by the
incumbent is available to all potential entrants; and (3) the incumbent
pricing. Formally,
el (p . MC1 ) / p
1 
= e2 (p2. MC 2) / P2
where:
total revenues - total costs,
pR pR = Ramsey prices in markets I and 2,
MV . 4 C0 - marginal cost prices in markets 1 and 2,
eP e2 = efasticity of demand in markets 1 and 2.
Ramsey, A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37 ECON. J. 47 (1927). For a modern exposition,
see Baumol & Bradford, Optimal Departures from Marginal Cost Pricing, 60 AM. ECON. REV. 265
(1970). For a more accessible discussion, see E. ZAJAC, supra note 45, at 22-27.
83. See A. MARSHALL, supra note 72, at 389-90.
84. A successful pricing strategy should maximize consumer welfare. Where joint or common
costs exist, this requires attention to class demands. In the broadest sense, this was always the objec-
tive of value-of-service pricing. In a rate-regulated multi-product industry with pervasive common or
joint costs among product lines, value-of-service pricing is thus an approximation of Ramsey-efficient
prices. Usage is a practical surrogate for consumer value.
85. See Kahn, supra note 4; MacAvoy & Robinson, supra note 46, at 259-60.
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cannot reduce prices immediately when faced with the threat of competi-
tive entry.8 6 Given these assumptions, the threat of hit-and-run competi-
tion will force an incumbent to make welfare-maximizing price and out-
put decisions. Therefore, even a natural monopolist will be forced to
refrain from monopolistic pricing-pricing at marginal revenue rather
than at marginal cost.8"
The theory of contestable markets as applied to a natural monopoly
differs in only one essential respect from the theory of natural monopoly
that has provided the historical framework for public utility regulation.
While both posit that under certain circumstances it is desirable to have
output supplied by a single firm (the natural monopoly firm), the theory
of contestable markets claims that production by a single firm can occur
without adverse consequences as a result of market forces while the theory
of natural monopoly assumes that it cannot. Absent adverse effects, regu-
lation is unnecessary; potential competition or, more correctly, market
contestability guards the public interest by ensuring that the monopolist
behaves competitively.
While the theory of contestable markets is full of abstract insights, the
conclusions that one draws from it are so dependent upon its assumptions
that judging its value and relevance to public policy is difficult."8 At most,
the theory simply emphasizes the importance of determining whether a
particular market is indeed a natural monopoly. If a natural monopoly is
present, restricting competitive entry is the safest regulatory course. If not,
there is no rationale for restricting entry. The theory of contestable
86. The airline industry is often cited as approximating a contestable market as defined above. See
Bailey, Contestability and the Design of Regulatory and Antitrust Policy, 71 AM. ECON. REV. PROc.
178-83 (1981). Contra, W. SHEPHERD, THE ECONOMICS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 333-34
(1st ed. 1979).
87. In an abstract way, the theory of contestable markets formalizes the notion of workable or
potential competition. On workable competition, see F. SCHERER, supra note 21, at 41-44.
88. See Snowberger, Sustainability Theory: Its Implications for Governmental Preservation of a
Regulated Monopoly, Q. REV. ECON. & Bus., Winter 1978, at 81; Shepard, Substainability, Deregu-
lation, and Separate Subsidiaries or Natura Non Facit Saltum, in CHALLENGES FOR PUBLIC UTIL-
ITY REGULATION IN THE 1980s, at 295 (H. Trebing ed. 1981); Shepherd, Contestability v. Competi-
tion, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 572 (1984). In the early development of the contestable markets literature,
the emphasis was upon sustainability rather than contestability. The theory was thought to justify
protection of a monopolist such as AT&T from market entry by competitors such as MCI. Once
AT&T negotiated a settlement of the Justice Department antitrust suit, emphasis shifted from sus-
tainability to contestability and the theory became a rationale for allowing entry into regulated tele-
communications markets. See, e.g., Testimony of R. Willig, on behalf of AT&T Communications of
Maryland, before the Maryland Public Service Commission, Case No. 7788 (Mar. 2, 1984) (on file
with the Yale Journal on Regulation). The case for selective competitive entry into long-distance
markets predates the development of the contestable markets literature and was a policy promoted by
others. See Trebing & Melody, Entry Conditions in Telecommunications, in REGULATION AND
ENTRY 93 (M. Klass & W. Shepherd eds. 1976). The contestable markets literature appears to have
been spawned originally by the search for a rationale to protect the dominant supplier from entry. It
is a very flexible theory that can be used to justify policies promoting or precluding entry, depending
upon the assumptions made.
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markets yields potentially valuable insights only when it is debatable
whether markets possess the characteristics of a natural monopoly. The
contestability theory has obvious implications for antitrust and regulatory
policy. Whether those implications are sufficient to merit regulatory
change remains less obvious. The assumption of negligible sunk costs is, of
course, critical and open to empirical question in public utility markets.
These industries are usually characterized by high fixed costs, many of
which are sunk and nonfungible and thus pose significant barriers to en-
try and exit.
Suppose that a market is a natural monopoly, and it is perfectly con-
testable. It might then be possible to deregulate the industry without fear
of economic harm. The threat of hit-and-run entry would dissipate the
market power of the monopolist, rendering traditional rate and entry reg-
ulation redundant and perhaps harmful. There is, however, a potential
complication. To ensure Pareto optimality (or Ramsey efficiency in the
case of a natural monopoly), a monopoly market must not only be contest-
able, it must also be sustainable.89 That is, if the monopolist can supply
the entire market at the lowest total cost to consumers, there must be no
opportunity for an alternative supplier to offer the commodity to some
segment of customers at a price below that which the monopolist offers to
all customers. 90
Faulhaber has shown that if average production costs first fall and then
rise, as shown in Figure 4, a monopoly is not sustainable.9' Suppose total
demand is equal to Q3 . A number of industry structures exist that could
satisfy this demand. For example, three firms could each produce Q1, at a
unit cost of P1 Since average costs are declining, however, this is not a
stable configuration.92 Alternatively, one firm could produce a level of out-
put equal to Q2, capturing two-thirds of the market, while leaving one-
third of the market to be supplied by a single firm producing Q1. A single
firm, can, nevertheless, still supply the total market at a lower cost, P 3 ,
than any other industry configuration:9
P 3 < (PlQ 1 + P2Q 2)/(Q 1 + Q2).
89. Panzar & Willig, Free Entry and the Sustainability of Natural Monopoly, 8 BELL J. ECON.
1 (1977).
90. Id.
91. Faulhaber, Cross-Subsidization: Pricing in Public Enterprises, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 966
(1975)
92. Each firm producing Q1 will attempt to lower its costs and expand its share of the market by
expanding to Q 2.
93. This expression derives from the relationships depicted in Figure 4 and simply states that the
price charged by a single monopoly supplier, P3 , is less than the weighted average of the prices paid
under competitive entry, P1 and P2'
Vol. 3: 53, 1985
Price Theory
In this case, however, total production by a single firm is not sustainable;
the monopolist is vulnerable to competitive entry.94
FIGURE 4
Contestable Natural Monopoly That Is
Not Sustainable
Q \Di D3 Quantity
While the sustainability literature has drawn much attention, the
notion that a natural monopoly may not be immune to the threat of com-
94. A single firm serving the entire market can be underpriced by an entrant that chooses to
supply only part of the market, Q,, at a price of P2. Production of Q3 by a single firm is thus not
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petitive entry is well known."5 Faulhaber and others9 provide new in-
sights into the old problem of cream-skimming."
Economists steeped in neoclassical price theory question the use of the
cream-skimming argument to justify regulatory barriers to competitive
entry. However, this criticism has tended to assume, either implicitly or
explicitly, that costs are separable, that is, all costs of service can be
ascribed to a particular customer or class of customers. Where costs are
not easily separable, the economists' criticism loses much of its force.
Faulhaber's demonstration of non-sustainability begs a crucial question:
why would average costs fall and then rise in the first place? A likely
reason is the presence of fixed costs." Fixed costs are common costs of a
sort: they are required to serve all customers who take service but are not
required to serve any given customer at the margin. They are thus not
easily separable, just as common costs are not directly allocable.
Nonseparability of fixed costs is the key to understanding Faulhaber's
argument. In Figure 4, average costs are presumed to decline and then
rise because of the presence of substantial fixed costs. The fixed costs
incurred to supply output Q3, however, are not separable; they are not
assignable to any specific customers. 9
Faulhaber has employed his analysis in the context of prices that are
said to be subsidy-free. 10 A price is not subsidy-free if, under any other
industry configuration, at least some consumers would enjoy lower prices.
A price equal to P3, which requires all consumers to share in the recovery
of nonseparable costs, is not subsidy-free, since at least some customers
would enjoy a lower price if an entrant captured two-thirds of the market
by producing at Q2 and offering price P 2-Under this alternative configur-
ation, however, lower prices for some consumers result in higher prices for
95. See Panzar & Willig, supra note 89.
96. Baumol, Bailey & Willig, Weak Invisible Hand Theorems on the Sustainability of Mul-
tiproduct Natural Monopoly, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 350 (1977); Panzar & Willig, supra note 89.
97. Cream-skimming refers to a competitive rival's decision to enter only the established firm's
most lucrative markets. The established firm is left to serve the least profitable segments of the market
and only a reduced share of the more profitable segments, but yet must earn an adequate return on
investment to cover the common costs of serving all segments of the market. See 2 A. KAHN, supra
note 24, at 7-10, 220-50. For a discussion of cream-skimming in telecommunications, see id. at 227-
233, 238-241. See also Brock & Evans, Creamskimming, in BREAKING UP BELL 61 (D. Evans ed.
1983).
98. Faulhaber demonstrates that if one defines a natural monopoly as a market which can be
supplied most cheaply by a single supplier, then the existence of natural monopoly is not dependent
solely upon the existence of decreasing average costs. The natural monopoly portion of the average
cost curve extends beyond the minimum point on the average cost curve, and encompasses a portion of
the curve in which average costs are rising. Natural monopoly thus depends upon "subadditivity of
costs" rather than economies of scale per se. See W. SHARKEY, supra note 76, at 66.
99. As a corollary to the notion of separability, we note that these costs are not avoidable if any of
the customers taking consumption at output Q3 should stop consuming.
100. See Faulhaber, supra note 91, at 966-67.
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the remaining consumers, and the total cost of service to the market
increases. If a competitive entrant captures two-thirds of the the market,
for example, the output of the monopolist incumbent would fall from Q3
to Q1, and the price paid by the incumbent's remaining customers would
rise to P. While the result is a stable industry configuration, it is not
Pareto optimal or Ramsey efficient. By moving back to a single supplier,
the reduction in price from P1 to P3 for the incumbent's customers would
more than offset the rise in price from P2 to P3 for the entrant's
customers.
Faulhaber's argument can also be explained in another manner. Pro-
duction by an entrant at Q2, with the former monopolist relegated to pro-
ducing at Q1, can be interpreted as a form of price discrimination.
Demand at any point to the left of curve D2 will be less elastic than
demand along curve D2. The entrant who chooses to serve demand D2,
while leaving demand D, to be served by the monopolist, is entering the
more elastic of the two markets. The monopolist is forced to discriminate
against less elastic customers by raising the price from P3 to P. 101 This is
as much cross-subsidization as the situation posited by Faulhaber, since it
hinges on price discrimination against a less elastic market segment.
The inefficient competition analyzed by Faulhaber can occur only if the
entrant is not obligated to serve the entire market.1 ' 2 Typically, a natural
monopolist is granted an exclusive franchise, which requires the monopo-
list to serve all customers, but prohibits competitive entry. Regulators have
feared that eliminating protection from competitive entry would produce
wasteful duplication of facilities, loss of revenues from cream-skimming,
and higher total costs to consumers. Nonsustainability is merely a more
elegant explanation of these intuitions.10 8
Incumbents in a contestable market are presumably unable to change
prices immediately. It is therefore assumed that incumbents are unable to
respond quickly to the threat of competitive entry. Suppose, however, that
regulators allow a natural monopolist to set prices flexibly so that entrants
are not given the opportunity to enter the market under the protection of a
"price umbrella." A natural monopolist would then react to the threat of
competitive entry by segmenting its markets and pricing Q2 at P2 for the
elastic segment of the market and Q1 at P1 for the inelastic segment.
101. The increased consumer costs caused by raising some prices from P3 to P1 more than offsets,
in the aggregate, the decrease in consumer costs as the price falls from P3 to P2 for the remainder of
the market. In the aggregate, then, total cost to consumers exceeds the total cost that would be col-
lected by an efficient supplier.
102. Faulhaber, supra note 91, at 972. See also Brock & Evans, supra note 97.
103. See W. BAUMOL, J. PANZAR & R. WILLIG, CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF
INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 371-444 (1982).
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Thus, when faced with the threat of entry, the natural monopolist's
defense is to engage in the same kind of inefficient pricing which results
from actual entry into a nonsustainable market. To the consumers left
paying P,, the result is the same. 10 4 The preferable solution is the classic
one: grant a franchise to the natural monopolist, require it to serve all
customers, regulate prices, and protect it from competitive but inefficient
entry. 0 5
The preceding analysis focuses only on the sustainability of a single-
product monopoly. Admittedly, the case of a multiproduct monopoly is
more complex. But the greater complexity only makes less likely the exis-
tence of all the requirements necessary to produce a contestable, sustaina-
ble monopoly. The "weak invisible hand"'0° required to ensure a sustain-
able set of Ramsey-efficient prices for a multiproduct monopolist will
likely be weak indeed.
One serious obstacle to Ramsey pricing in a multiproduct monopoly
arises because monopolists are likely to allocate common or joint costs dif-
ferently than competitive entrants who choose to produce only a subset of
the products supplied by the multiproduct monopolist. In such a situation,
the monopolist would be forced to engage in price discrimination to pre-
vent competitive entry. Since price discrimination would involve a non-
welfare-maximizing pattern of cost allocation or cost recovery, a sustaina-
ble set of prices would no longer be optimal. Thus, for multiproduct
monopolies, sustainability and optimality may be mutually exclusive.
Whether a given service or set of services is a natural monopoly thus
constitutes the threshold question. Contestability alone is insufficient to
ensure an outcome that is in the public interest. To obtain a welfare-
maximizing result without price and entry regulation, a market must not
only be contestable, it must also be sustainable. But if the latter condition
is met, we should observe the absence of competitive entry. In a natural
monopoly, the existence of competitive entry, especially when it represents
entry into only one segment of the market, is likely evidence of
non-sustainability. The correct policy response is the traditional one: price
and entry regulation.
104. The price umbrella argument is thus hardly a defense for allowing flexible pricing by natu-
ral monopolies, since, to forestall entry, the monopolist must adopt the same inefficient market seg-
mentation that would result from entry.
105. See Brock & Scheinkman, Free Entry and the Sustainability of Natural Monopoly: Ber-
trand Revisited by Cournot, in BREAKING UP BELL 231 (D. Evans ed. 1983).
106. For a description of the "weak invisible hand", see Baumol, Bailey & Willig, supra note 96,
at 350-51.
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D. Static and Dynamic Concepts of Market Efficiency
In the preceding sections, our justifications of flat-rate pricing and the
separations process are based on a static analysis of efficiency in consump-
tion, that is, allocative efficiency. Allocative efficiency concerns the distri-
bution of output to its highest-valued use, not the way output is produced.
Efficiency in production, on the other hand, requires that any given quan-
tity of output be produced at minimum cost.
The concept of allocative efficiency is a severely limited framework for
policy analysis. It defines efficiency in subjective terms by focusing on the
satisfaction of consumer demands rather than on the cost of production.
The public, however, seems to expect that structural reform of the tele-
communications industry will reduce the cost of telecommunications, as
evidenced by the common view that any increase in local rates should be
more than offset by a reduction in toll rates.'07 Regulatory reforms lead-
ing to a more allocatively efficient rate structure may accomplish a non-
quantifiable increase in total consumer welfare, but they do not guarantee
reduced telephone prices.
While an increase in allocative efficiency, if attained, would be a worth-
while accomplishment, it is an elusive goal. Furthermore, it is difficult to
measure the welfare loss attributable to inefficient allocation induced by
entry and price regulation. Attempts to measure the welfare loss from
monopoly pricing and output restrictions have met with only limited suc-
cess and have generally produced such low estimates that some economists
have been led to question the usefulness of antitrust actions.108 It has also
been argued that the true cost of monopoly is the lack of diligence on the
part of the monopolist in the choice of production techniques, rather than
the welfare loss due to monopolistic restriction.' 9
Productive efficiency offers much greater opportunity for increasing
consumer utility in the telephone market than allocative efficiency because
cost reductions resulting from technological advances and scale economies
are enormous."' Static price theory takes as given the supply functions
and thus ignores the effect of regulation on production efficiency. Joseph
Schumpeter argues that the theory of perfect competition is useless as an
explanation for the awesome efficiency of capitalist production:
107. See Joskow, supra note 63 (discussing the public shock that telephone rates are, on average,
rising).
108. See Bergson, On Monopoly Welfare Losses, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 853 (1973); C. ROWLEY,
ANTITRUST AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY (1973). See generally F. SCHERER, supra note 21, at 459-
96.
109. See F. SCHERER, supra note 21, at 423-38.
110. J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY, 104-06 (3d ed. 1950).
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[P]erfectly free entry into a new field may make it impossible to
enter it at all. The introduction of new methods of production and
new commodities is hardly conceivable with perfect-and perfectly
prompt-competition from the start. And this means that the bulk of
economic progress is incompatible with it. What we have got to
accept is that [capitalism] has come to be the most powerful engine
of that progress and in particular of the long-run expansion of total
output not only in spite of, but to a considerable extent through, this
strategy which looks so restrictive when viewed in the individual case
and from the individual point of time. In this respect, perfect compe-
tition is not only impossible but inferior, and has no title to being set
up as a model of efficiency.
Under certain conditions,111 competitive markets may hinder efficiency in
production by stifling technological advances. If a competitive firm's cost-
reducing innovations could be easily and promptly duplicated by its com-
petitors, it would nct invest in research and development because it could
not raise prices to recover that investment. The same stalemate would
occur in perfectly contestable markets.
Allocative efficiency promoted by "correct" pricing policies can have
only a minimal effect on what Schumpqter called "the rate of increase of
total output,""'  while the exploitation of technological change and econo-
mies of scale will have a significant impact on real economic growth. For
evidence, one need look no further than what has happened in the tele-
communications industry over the last decade. From 1973 through 1981,
gross product per person employed in communcations increased 5.1 per-
cent per year, whereas for private industry as a whole, the annual rate of
increase in gross product per person employed was only 0.4 percent.'
This period presumably coincides with the period during which the "inef-
ficiency of our historic method of subsidizing basic service . . . [became]
intolerable."" 4 In other words, we are supposed to believe that the most
efficient sector of our economy was intolerably inefficient.
111. See F. SCHERER, supra note 21, at 423-38. In addition to stifling competition, ruthless price-
cutting may pose an obstacle to capital investment in new technology by forcing competitors to base
their market response on short-run, rather than long-run, marginal costs. A case in point is the
recently deregulated airline industry. Faced with aggressive competition and price cutting, airlines
defer maintenance and capital investment that would reduce costs in the long run. Thus, the fleet is
aging and airlines are deferring investment in more fuel efficient planes. Paper Reports Airlines
Buying More Used Jets, Ark. Gazette, Nov. 18, 1985, at 5A.
112. J. SCHUMPETER, supra note 110, at 63.
113. Ketering, Economic Performance of U.S. Industries, 1979-1981, in 1983 U.S. INDUSTRIAL
OUTLOOK, XXI (1983).
114. Kahn, supra note 34, at 25.
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III. Policy Implications
For better or worse, competition in interstate telecommunications is
largely a fait accompli. State regulatory bodies are encountering consider-
able pressure to open up intraLATA markets to competition, and to adopt
rate structures that depart radically from historic pricing practices. Fed-
eral policy toward telecommunications is the model which state regulators
find themselves increasingly pressured to adopt. However, structural dif-
ferences between interstate, intrastate, and especially intraLATA markets
suggest that the kind of competition now common in interstate markets
may be inappropriate for intrastate and intraLATA markets.
In our view, historic pricing practices have not caused the degree of
price distortion between local and long-distance services that some have
alleged. Selective competitive pressures in the interstate and long-haul
intrastate markets may be appropriate policy if all suppliers make an
appropriate"1 6 and equal contribution to the recovery of access costs. The
opportunities for cream-skimming are limited because new entrants must
employ the same technology and make the same investments as the domi-
nant supplier.1 6 The access charges borne by interLATA long-distance
carriers should incorporate not only the cost of accessing the public
switched network, but also some portion of the cost of the local loop as
well, since both costs are necessary for end-point delivery of long-distance
services.
Selective competitive entry is less desirable in intraLATA markets.
Local and toll service in proximity to the local network is likely to be a
natural monopoly because switching is more likely to be a cost-effective
substitute for transmission at the intrastate level than at the interstate
level. At the local network level, switching replaces cable pairs running
between each and every user. The public switched network is an excellent
example of efficient capital substitution: substituting switches and trunk
lines for direct cable pairs between each and every user greatly reduces
the overall, level of capital investment required. The same public switched
network which makes local calling possible also routes interLATA calls
and intraLATA toll calls to end users. Eventually the public switched
network may become obsolete-if the cost of point-to-point communica-
tions via satellite, for example, should fall below the cost of a local loop.
115. An appropriate contribution to the recovery of access costs is one that requires toll users to
make a contribution to the recovery of the cost of the local loop in proportion to usage, as suggested by
our analysis of the network as a public good. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. It is the
quantity used, rather than the price paid, that characterizes equilibrium between supply and demand
in a public goods context, implying that toll users should be allocated local loop costs in proportion to
usage.
116. Cream-skimming is only possible when a prospective entrant faces lower costs than the
incumbent firm. However, the prospective entrant has little room for cost savings when it is required
to employ the same technology and capital investment as the incumbent.
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But until that happens, the cost of the public switched network will have
to be borne by the local operating companies. The presence of this econ-
omy of scope, which arises from being able to use the same switched net-
work for local and toll service, suggests that at the local level telecommu-
nications remains a natural monopoly. Since the local telephone company
can provide both services efficiently, the local company's territory should
be safeguarded from competitive entry.
The monopoly markets described above are likely to be contestable but
nonsustainable11 In such a market, competitive entry will drive up over-
all costs without providing attendant social benefits. New entrants will
engage in cream-skimming, taking advantage of the existence of the public
switched network without having to price at the full cost of the service
being provided. More and more of the costs of the switched network will
be diverted to incumbent's remaining customers. If incumbents are
granted pricing flexibility to respond to threats of competitive entry, they
will engage in the same kind of price discrimination as their rivals prac-
tice. While a limited form of price discrimination is consistent with the
argument above, it should not be allowed to go so far that toll service
customers can escape entirely a ratable allocation of the cost of the local
loop. State regulators should therefore limit competitive entry into local
telecommunications markets, at least given the presently available
technology.
We view the LATAs arising from divestiture as sufficient approxima-
tions-for public policy purposes-of the natural monopoly that remains
at the local level. They were created with the express purpose of provid-
ing the local operating companies with sufficient revenues to remain
financially stable and viable. Since the responsibility for the public
switched network rests ultimately with the local operating companies,
instability and the loss of revenues from intraLATA competition would
suggest that those who are using the local network, and benefiting from its
existence, are not shouldering their share of the burden. The existence of
opportunites for competitors to offer lower prices to selected segments of
intraLATA markets is not itself evidence that entry is good public policy.
It may simply reflect the fact that the local market, while a natural
monopoly, is nonsustainable. But if it is a natural monopoly, the lowest
overall cost of service results from prohibiting entry. Until technology
advances to the point where the public switched network becomes techno-
logically obsolete, public policy toward telecommunications requires the
preservation of financially viable local operating companies, and this in
117. See supra notes 86-94 and accompanying text.
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turn requires a monopoly over intraLATA toll service. It also requires a
contribution from interLATA and intraLATA toll users toward recovery
of the cost of the local loop. Traditional regulatory objectives, such as uni-
versal service; traditional regulatory concerns about cream-skimming and
lost revenues if selective entry is permitted; and traditional regulatory
mechanisms for achieving these objectives, such as rate averaging and cost
allocation, all retain their validity at the local level. Thus, intraLATA
service should not be deregulated. The local telephone companies should
be allowed to maintain their exclusive franchises to service all calls within
each LATA.

